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This paper discusses the role that trade can potentially play in both negotiating and operating a post
Kyoto/post 2012 global climate policy regime. As an addition to the bargaining set for a global climate
negotiation, trade in principle widens the range of jointly beneficial potential outcomes and can in
this sense be a potential facilitator of an agreed global climate regime. The reverse is also true, that
in a linked climate-trade-finance global policy coordination structure that goes well beyond what was
envisioned at Bretton Woods, climate now added to the global policy bargaining set also offers the
prospect of potentially stronger trade disciplines (and even beyond WTO disciplines being negotiated).
Trade policy can as well be an instrument for the implementation of a global climate regime, since
trade provides a mechanism for achieving an internalization outcome for the global externality that
climate change represents, and that provides a potentially more efficient outcome and also helps meet
distributional objectives. In short, trade added to the emerging post 2012 climate regime can both expand
the bargaining set for both (effectively linked) negotiations, and additionally provide an instrument
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This paper discusses the role that trade can potentially play in both negotiating and 
operating a post Kyoto/post 2012 global climate policy regime. What such a regime may 
be will hinge on the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations initiated in Bali in 2007 and 
to be concluded in Durban later this year. If little materializes in Durban, the 
commitments made in Copenhagen in 2009 under the Copenhagen Accord will largely 
define the regime for the immediate period going forward from 2012, with no formal role 
for trade policy. However, trade policy linked to climate policy commitments lurks in the 
background. 
Here I argue that as an addition to the bargaining set for a global climate negotiation, 
trade in principle widens the range of jointly beneficial potential outcomes and can in this 
sense be a potential facilitator of an agreed global climate regime. But the reverse is also 
true, that in a linked climate-trade-finance global policy coordination structure that goes 
well beyond what was envisioned at Bretton Woods, climate now added to the global 
policy bargaining set also offers the prospect of potentially stronger trade disciplines (and 
even beyond WTO disciplines being negotiated). Furthermore, trade policy can as well be 
an instrument for the implementation of a global climate regime, since trade provides a 
mechanism for achieving an internalization outcome for the global externality that 
climate change represents, and that provides a potentially more efficient outcome and 
also helps meet distributional objectives. In short, trade added to the emerging post 2012 
climate regime can both expand the bargaining set for both (effectively linked) 
negotiations, and additionally provide an instrument for the implementation of an agreed 
outcome. Whether this added linkage can be successfully exploited in the seemingly short   3
time remaining for the UNFCCC post 2012 negotiation (as in the WTO Uruguay Round 
which expanded the trade bargaining set by adding intellectual property and services) is 
unclear. But, currently there is pessimism as to whether any significant outcome from 
Durban can emerge, even before trade policy is added to the negotiation. 
I then go on to suggest that it may also be useful to acknowledge what trade cannot 
do for a global climate policy outcome. First, trade offers nothing that will help resolve 
the property rights issue of who has rights to do what, and who should be compensated 
by whom and by how much for actions that follow aiming to internalize the global 
externality that climate change represents. But at the same time property rights remain the 
critical (if not the central) issue for the developing countries in a global climate 
negotiation since they both assert historical responsibility for emissions of individual 
countries (and especially developed countries) and hence in emissions reduction, and also 
seek preferential treatment under the Common but Differential Responsibilities (CBDR) 
doctrine enshrined in the 1994 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). In the classical development of externality literature, Pigou (1932) 
argued for the use of internalizing Pigouvian taxes. Later, Coase (1960) argued that once 
rights to do what are assigned (by courts) bargaining will achieve internalization, and if 
achieved in this way, Pigouvian taxes will only worsen outcomes. Relative to this 
discussion, climate stands as a trans border global externality over which courts have no 
jurisdiction to award rights, and hence power and political process determine implicit 
property right outcomes. Trade cannot help directly in this process of internalization, but 
will potentially play a role in the exercise of transnational power via threatened or actual 
trade measures if proposals for cooperation made towards others are not met.     4
Trade, in my view, also cannot assist to any significant degree in providing the 
compensation (in cash or in kind) that will be needed for full developing country 
participation in global emissions reduction arrangements. The size of compensation 
needed for developing countries, implicitly discussed in Copenhagen, would seem to be 
too large to be met by an accommodation in trade policies in developed countries towards 
developing country exports. 
I also note that as an instrument for achieving internalization of the global 
externality that climate implies trade policy remains only a second best instrument. The 
first best internalization mechanism is full global carbon pricing (achievable with an 
equivalent carbon tax). Trade policy comes into the picture if such a mechanism is 
unachievable due to nonparticipation by a subset of countries, and/or differentiated 
commitment levels by countries in terms of implied joint global emissions reduction 
under global projection of national commitments. Trade policy will inevitably distort 
production and consumption of goods both internally and will do so globally, but these 
costs may be justified by the benefits of the higher emissions reduction achieved in their 
absence. 
I finally note that the unilateral commitments that have been made by both 
developed and developing countries, both in the run up to Copenhagen and since I 
suggest that as far as a commitment period out to 2020 (or even 2030) is concerned, these 
are such that the additional commitments needed to achieve an outcome jointly 
acceptable to all countries and consistent with IPCC (or some such as proposed G20) 
temperature change targets may be modest. If this is the case, the extra work that trade 
would need to contribute to a globally agreeable outcome could be less than some   5
suppose. Put differently, trade can perhaps be considered in terms of what is needed to 
add to the multilateral negotiating process to take it over a threshold starting from 
sizeable unilateral commitments, rather than from a de novo zero commitment situation.
2 
In what follows, I first discuss the UNFCCC process thus far and the potential roles 
that have been proposed or have potentially emerged for trade. Next I evaluate trade’s 
potential role as both a facilitator of global bargaining and an instrument of execution for 
a post Kyoto regime. I then discuss trade’s role in property rights, transfers, and 
potentially achieving efficiency improvements. I then offer some additional concluding 
remarks, including on unilateral commitments. 
The Stern report labeled climate change as the largest externality yet encountered 
by either global or national economic policymakers. The change to the post Bretton 
Woods global policy coordination structure that coordinated globally internalizing 
country climate policies implies is equally large. The challenges that these new linkages 
imply between climate and trade and finance are, in my view, only just beginning to be 
understood and my aim here is primarily to help delineate them rather than in any way 
resolve them. They are an inevitable part of our 21
st century global economy.  
 
2. HOW ARE TRADE AND CLIMATE POLICIES LINKED? 
 
a. Institutional Evolution of Linkage 
Trade and climate change mitigation policies both form part of the policy coverage 
of global economic policy coordination that now links national economies globally. In 
1944 at Bretton Woods when the post war architecture of global policy coordination was 
                                                 
2 The contribution of unilateral commitments is also commented on in Stern and Taylor (2010).   6
discussed and later agreed to in the form of the World Bank/IMF/GATT-WTO triad 
which has shaped the post war economy ever since, national economies were conceived 
of as only linked through trade and finance (including aid flows). The objectives of 
global policy coordination were to achieve sustained global growth, prevent any return to 
a major global depression (as in the 1930s), and to facilitate the growth and development 
of developing countries (and with it alleviate global poverty). In this structure, physical 
interactions between national economies in the form of external effects related to 
environmental issues did not enter. 
But in the last 40 or 50 years, environmental issues have emerged and grown in 
prominence globally to the point that the original Bretton Woods architecture and 
environmental issues are now inextricably linked, even if the formal structure of the 
Bretton Woods institutions does not explicitly accommodate this linkage. From its 
beginning as a localized set of concerns involving such issues as pesticides and impacts 
on bird populations as in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1960), to more global issues 
involving thinning of the ozone layer in the 1980s environmental issues progressively 
moved from a local to a global stage. Later in the 1990s, and following the then GATT 
dispute settlement case involving Mexican and other tuna catches and incidental dolphin 
kills, the interactions between trade policy and environment policies became a 
preoccupation in the WTO (after its 1994 emergence from its GATT origins). The 1990s 
also saw the first Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, the emergence of climate mitigation as a 
central global environmental issue, and the 1994 agreement on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Climate change thus 
increasingly assumed a central position as a quantitatively dominant global   7
environmental issue in a global policy coordination structure that formally excluded 
environmental issues, but one into which de facto environmental issues were proliferating 
as dominant political concerns.  
This is what I take as the starting point for my discussion of trade and climate 
policy linkage. They both impact on areas of joint economic activity involving nation 
states and both define areas of mutual gain and potential loss both globally for the world 
economy, and also individually for nation states. But the sequencing involved in the 
evolution of this now de facto linked regime established sub-regime precedence. Trade 
and finance came first, and their rule structure in global interaction was agreed in the 
early post war years and in isolation from environmental issues. This created the 
precedent that trade and finance rules were a commitment which was taken as given and 
hence would constrain subsequent global environmental agreements. In 1947 the world 
had a GATT with GATT articles, which was to evolve into the WTO. The world is still 
waiting for a World Environmental Organization.  
 
b. Elements of Linkage 
What then are the major elements of de facto linkage between trade and climate 
mitigation policies within this implicitly linked global policy structure? I will focus on 
three broad forms of linkage and then elaborate on each.  
Firstly is the direct linkage that mutually agreed actions in one area directly affect 
economic activity in the other. This can be, for instance, that climate mitigation 
agreements raise the price of emitting carbon and hence energy costs, and as a result 
directly affect trade flows by changing relative product prices and country incomes. Or it   8
can be that new trade barriers affecting, say, transfers of technology make the 
achievement of climate mitigation goals more difficult to achieve.  
Second comes linkage in global policy bargaining. China, for example, may be 
more willing to undertake climate mitigation policies if, at the same time, there is 
agreement on trade arrangements which gives China more security over market access 
(say, through more restricted use of antidumping actions against China). Or, financial 
transfers between wealthier and poorer countries may induce poorer country participation 
in global climate change mitigation negotiations.  
Third comes linkage in the implementation of agreements in the two subareas. 
Climate mitigation agreements, for instance, may cover only a subset of countries, and if 
so concerns arise among participants over leakage (increases in emissions in non 
participant countries) and possible noncompetitive effects acting against domestic 
companies in participant countries. Border tax adjustments (tariffs based on carbon 
content applied to imports from non participant countries and export rebates for exports 
to them) then arise as trade based instruments supporting the implementation of a 
subglobal climate agreement. 
 
c. Direct Interactions Between Trade and Climate 
Direct interactions between trade and climate mitigation policies arise in a number 
of dimensions. One is the effect on trade flows from carbon mitigation policies based on 
the full carbon pricing required to meet a target emission reduction globally of a given 
percentage as the internalization vehicle in participating countries. Under full carbon 
pricing, energy input costs rise and these flow through into the prices of internationally   9
traded goods and services. Price rises will be largest for the most energy intensive 
commodities. These prices increases will tend to reduce the exports of participant 
countries in a subglobal climate mitigation agreement and also change the composition of 
trade. Importantly, one of the major substitution effects that will occur will be 
substitution out of traded manufactured goods into non traded services. Piggott and 
Whalley (1992) used a multi country general equilibrium trade model in which energy 
entered as a substitutable input along with capital and labor in production in all major 
world trading areas. Calibrating their model to 1986 data and introducing carbon pricing 
required to reduce emissions by 80 per cent of 1990 levels in their model implied a 
reduction in the level of world trade of 50 per cent. Some countries who were previously 
exporters of energy intensive manufactures became importers under this carbon pricing. 
Importantly, this large trade impact from climate mitigation is something which if it were 
to occur the framework of WTO would offer no remedy through WTO disciplines and the 
resulting change in trade flows is in no way incompatible with WTO rules and something 
over which the WTO cannot directly intervene. This size of impact also implies a reversal 
of trade growth from possible eventual global climate policy perhaps of a similar order of 
magnitude to the stimulus to world trade attributed to trade liberalization through 
WTO/GATT disciplines since 1947. These impacts occur most dramatically under full 
carbon pricing for a major emissions reduction. Under cap and trade carbon limitation 
arrangements cost effects on average are much reduced, although at the margin they still 
apply.
3 
                                                 
3 Bohringer et al. (1998) present a general equilibrium model capturing the different impacts in the EU of 
different arrangements for emissions limitation policies. Distributional impacts vary substantially.   10
Another area of direct linkage occurs with the trade and other adaptations needed to 
ensure full execution of climate mitigation policies. Thus, for effective mitigation of 
carbon emissions in lower income countries transfer of technologies would make the 
process more efficient and effective. Trade barriers which remain in place against 
technology products (or now contemplated as under the recent section 301 Clean 
Technology investigation in the US
4) make this process more difficult. Equally, there is 
concern that intellectual property arrangements in lower income countries can operate to 
impede the import of greener technology and related carbon emission mitigation actions 




d. Bargaining Interactions 
A second broad area of climate-trade interactions occurs through the impacts on 
global policy bargaining which involves both trade and climate mitigation policies when 
they are jointly undertaken. For now these are separate policy bargaining areas under the 
WTO (for trade) and UNFCCC (for climate) in which linkage does not formally enter.
6 
Implicitly there are several areas of such linkage and in the years ahead the pressures will 
likely be for this linkage to grow and to be explicitly incorporated in institutional 
arrangements. This could be some decades off for a post-post Kyoto negotiation, but the 
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pressures for such formal linkage seem likely to grow. Broadly speaking, most 
economists would agree that broadening bargaining to allow for more cross over 
possibilities in the bargaining set expands the range of bargaining and hence is a good 
thing. An enlarged bargaining set offers more gains from bargaining (also see the 
discussion in Abrego et al (2001)). 
One clear area of cross over between the two elements of bargaining would seem 
likely to occur for countries for whom trade access for exports is a major preoccupation, 
and for whom stronger disciplines in trade might make it easier for them to accept 
climate commitments which harm their own economic performance. One such case is 
China for whom export growth in recent years since the 2008 Financial Crisis runs at 
nearly 30 per cent/year and for whom continued export growth is central to maintaining 
high GDP growth. China, by some counts, is subject to around 25 per cent of all global 
antidumping measures and WTO disciplines offer little or effectively no relief. Moving 
trade disciplines beyond current WTO arrangements could thus be a Chinese interest 
which would require new disciplines beyond those currently in the WTO. China also 
faces trade actions in safeguards (Chinese tires) and unilateral trade remedy (US Section 
301/Clean Technology) which they would wish to restrain. China may be more willing to 
contemplate firmer and more substantial climate mitigation commitments if firmer 
disciplines were to apply over trade measures against her.  
At the same time, however, linkage in bargaining across areas may be a negative in 
allowing for the explicit use of penalties or threats of measures in one area to achieve 
country negotiating objectives in the other. Excluding formal linkage could help partially 
block these; and thus may help poorer countries. Such a situation potentially arises with   12
border tax adjustments and their potential use as a threat against countries choosing not to 
fully participate in global climate mitigation negotiations. Here, linkage in bargaining 
could make some countries worse off, and raise the potential global costs of non 
achievement of climate negotiating objectives if threats were actually implemented.  
 
e. Linkage in Implementation 
A final broad area of climate-trade linkage arises through linkage in implementation 
of agreements. Border tax adjustments are seen by OECD countries as necessary to 
achieve what they see as efficient and fair outcomes from a sub-global agreement that 
only a subset of countries might sign onto (see Hauser et al. (2008), and Lockwood and 
Whalley (2010)). Concerns centre on leakage (elevated emissions by nonparticipants) and 
competitiveness effects against domestic firms. The inherent inefficiencies arising from 
trade diversion effects involving products produced in participant countries, where 
companies bear the costs of emission reducing measures, and non participant countries it 
can be argued are partially counteracted by the use of border adjustments. Whether such 
border adjustments will achieve their intended effects is discussed by Lockwood and 
Whalley (2010), and was an earlier issue with border adjustments accompanying the 
VAT in Europe in the 1960s. 
Another example of this linkage involves financial transfers. Under the 1994 
UNFCCC, developing countries were granted a special status in climate negotiations 
under an agreed rubric referred to as “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” 
(CBDR). This implied that developing countries would accept responsibility for climate 
mitigation along with developed countries, but that their responsibility was to be different.   13
This was later interpreted that developing countries should be recipients of compensation 
both for climate related damage to help then adapt to climate change, and for foregone 
growth and development as a result of taking on climate related commitments. In the 
UNFCCC negotiations which followed both in Kyoto in 1997 and in Copenhagen in 2009, 
the size of the adaptation fund to accompany climate commitments became a major issue 
in negotiation, implicitly reflecting financial transfers to developing countries through 
linkage of finance to climate arrangements.  
 
 
3. TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR 
 
 
  Despite all the discussion of how trade can potentially play a role in global 
climate change mitigation negotiations, thus far there is a relative absence of trade 
considerations in the formal proceedings of UNFCCC negotiations on climate policy. 
Rather, trade lurks both on the fringes and in the future as an element to be factored in, 
rather than thus far as a central element at the heart of negotiation on concrete 
commitments. 
  The current UNFCCC climate change negotiations effectively began globally 
with the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, where the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was drafted and opened for signing. Following this summit, 
the UNFCCC was ratified in 1994 and emerged as the founding global constitutional 
arrangement to focus subsequent negotiation on climate change mitigation. In this 
Convention, all signatories jointly committed themselves to discuss climate change and 
also meet periodically to develop global measures directed to containment and adaptation   14
to damage from climate change. Unlike the 1947 GATT which laid out 35 Articles 
specifying limitations on how member countries could use trade policies, the UNFCCC 
contained little by way of specifics, either on rules or on process for future negotiation 
and how to deal with climate change. The one tangible commitment (other than to 
commit to discuss the issue) was a joint commitment by all members to the principle of 
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). Under this it was agreed that 
developing countries along with developed countries accepted joint responsibility for the 
human component of climate change, but that responsibilities for alleviating damage 
would in some way be differentiated between developed and developing countries. The 
interpretation of this commitment was left for future clarification, a matter which still lies 
at the heart of negotiation today. Trade as a central issue thus did not arise with the 
creation of the UNFCCC. Trade is only mentioned once in the original 1994 UNFCCC 
text as also, in the most recent Cancun documents, as an area that should not be 
‘arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminated against or restricted’ by climate policy. The 
uses of trade policy as supporting instruments for a climate regime, or linked trade and 
climate bargaining do not arise and are not mentioned. 
  After 1994 the mandate to continue discussions on climate change among UN 
members (signatories to the Convention) provided the institutional momentum for a 
series of sequential meetings labeled “committee of parties” or COPs. At each COP, 
discussion of climate related matters occurred around an agreed agenda, with agreement 
also reached on both the timing and location of the next COP. COPs thus began their 
advance; but ‘trade and climate change’ did not feature as an issue.   15
  Under this COP process, the first significant advance occurred in COP3 in 1997, 
which was to conclude the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol; the first substantive 
agreement on climate change policies
7. Under this agreement, the world was divided into 
two groups: Annex 1 countries (effectively developed countries plus Russia) who agreed 
to take on commitments on emission reduction out to 2012 (relative to a 1990 base); and 
non-Annex 1 countries (developing countries) who took on no commitments. The form 
and depth of commitment varied by Annex 1 country. A range of accompanying 
measures were also agreed to which focused on flexibility in the implementation of 
commitments.  
More concretely these allowed for the trading of emissions reduction 
commitments both among Annex 1 countries in the form of Joint Implementation (JI) and 
between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries in the form of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). As such, trade appears in the Kyoto Protocol, but not in reference to 
international trade in goods and services, and rather in relation to trading of emissions 
reduction commitments.  
The Kyoto Protocol effectively became the first round of global climate policy 
negotiations in an ongoing sequential process guided by the COPs, much as negotiating 
Rounds in the GATT (and then the WTO) characterized an ongoing negotiating process 
from 1947 up to the present Doha Round. Relative to GATT/ WTO, however, the Kyoto 
Protocol is widely regarded as weak discipline since penalties are almost absent and 
determinations of (non-)compliance are virtually lacking. For example, current 
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into force 16 February 2005.   16
expectations are that a number of Annex 1 countries could well be in significant violation 
of their Kyoto Protocol commitments by 2012, when the Protocol is scheduled to 
conclude, but the penalties against them would seem meagre and would also take 
considerable time to define and implement. 
  After Kyoto, the position of the US became a major topic of discussion since 
successive US administrations did not take the Protocol to the US Congress for 
ratification, and so US commitments entered into Kyoto by the Executive Branch had no 
legal foundation in US law. But as earlier, international trade in goods and services did 
not enter into subsequent COP discussions. 
  A departure in this pattern arose with COP13 in Bali in December 2007
8. This 
COP meeting had as its objective to lay the foundation for a negotiation on the global 
climate policy regime to follow on after Kyoto in 2012. In two weeks of negotiation in 
Bali a "Bali Road Map" was agreed as the framework to guide a global negotiation to 
follow. This was a negotiation to conclude in Copenhagen in December 2009, and was to 
focus on four so-called "pillars" of negotiation. One was to be 'mitigation' (or emissions 
reduction commitments), another was to be 'adaptation' to climate change (a fund to 
finance adjustment, largely by developing countries), another was to be 'innovation' (a 
fund to finance new technologies to combat emissions), and a final one was labeled 'trade 
and finance'. The latter was to allow negotiations to also focus on the financing of climate 
change mitigation, following a calculation produced by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) that $45 trillion of resources would be needed to facilitate climate change 
                                                 
8 UNFCCC (2007)   17
mitigation out to 2050
9 (with that amount increasing by $500 billion with each year of 
inaction). There was also reference to the need for trade policy to support climate change 
mitigation by reducing or eliminating trade barriers which impeded needed transfers of 
technology. But no other form of trade-climate linkage either appeared in the Bali 
documents or entered the negotiations that preceded these, with no mention of border tax 
adjustments. 
  Between Bali in 2007 and the 2009 Copenhagen meeting relatively little was 
decided on to advance to the specifics needed to implement the Bali Road Map, and the 
associated COP meetings also did not touch directly on trade. But international trade 
considerations different from those foreseen as part of the Bali Roadmap instead began to 
enter discussions outside the formalities of the UNFCCC process, and seemingly in a 
major way. Discussion began to center on trade policy as a mechanism that could be used 
to achieve implementation by sub-groups of countries of emissions reduction through the 
use of border tax adjustments based on the carbon content of goods crossing international 
borders. These would be against either non-participant countries in negotiations, or 
countries which participated less than fully. 
  What was envisaged was a series of tariffs on imports and rebates on exports 
reflecting the higher costs of production for domestic producers in countries undertaking 
emissions reductions relative to producers in countries where emissions reductions were 
not to occur. The objective was to deal with two interrelated issues, so-called 'leakage' 
(nonparticipant countries increasing emissions when participant countries reduced theirs) 
and anti-competitiveness effects against domestic producers in participant countries. 
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  Formal discussion of such measures accelerated in 2007 in Europe and in 2008 in 
the US. This was to lead to draft legislation in the EU being advanced to the Commission 
in 2009 and in the US the incorporation of border tax adjustments into the House version 
of the Waxman Markey bill in 2009. This latter legislation involves border adjustments 
working via emissions allowances to be purchased by importers on a basis comparable to 
those bought by domestic producers per unit of production, and to be refunded as 
allowances to exporters reflecting the amount purchased per unit of production by 
domestic producers. EU legislation in contrast to the US system is instead based on 
measured carbon content of production in exporting countries. 
  This discussion of border tax adjustments inevitably provoked strong negative 
reaction from developing country exporters who voiced fears of a global economy 
becoming decarbonized and protectionist at one and the same time. Their characterization 
was of border tax adjustments being used as a threat, formally outside of the UNFCCC 
negotiation, but implicitly entering as a potential penalty for nonparticipation. Their view 
was that this implied that their participation or nonparticipation was to be accompanied 
by both financial transfer as carrots (the adaption fund as part of the UNFCCC 
negotiations) and trade policy as a stick (border tax adjustments formally outside the 
UNFCCC process). Debate on these measures continued throughout Copenhagen until 
today. 
  The meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009 at COP15
10 was convened in high 
hopes of a conclusion to negotiations on a substantive post-2012/ post-Kyoto regime but 
floundered in some disarray before its conclusion. In the first week there were multi-
bracketed ill-defined draft texts which in the second week, with high level political 
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involvement, were put on one side. It then reached a conclusion in the form of the 
Copenhagen Accord driven by a late US-China bilateral negotiation subsequently 
extended to the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, ASEAN, South Africa, India, China). 
The Copenhagen Accord reflects an outcome in which countries first pledge to honor 
unilateral commitments on emissions reduction entered into before Copenhagen. They 
then agreed to a yet to be defined mutual verification procedure (which respects national 
sovereignty with no entity to enforce or make site visits), and commit to 'work towards' a 
new Climate Fund to assist developing countries of $100 billion/year by 2020.
11 Trade 
policy as such did not appear in the Copenhagen Accord. 
  In some ways this is a minimalist outcome. But a more positive interpretation of 
Copenhagen is that it did represent a consensus outcome and it also established a 
framework for subsequent negotiations to finalize a post-2012 arrangement. Also, the 
size of unilateral commitments entered into prior to Copenhagen in some people's minds 
are close to the order that a multilateral negotiation might have anyway achieved for 2020 
implementation, and so unilateral commitments may anyway have achieved much of the 
intended outcome. 
  Following Copenhagen have come subsequent UNFCCC meetings in Tianjin in 
the summer of 2010 and Cancun in December of the same year. The outcome from 
Cancun has been portrayed as positive relative to Copenhagen in that both developed and 
developing countries commit to make reductions in emissions post-2012, and advances 
occurred on the verification component of Copenhagen and in specific areas such as 
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deforestation.
12 But details of what joint commitments might be are few. The specifics of 
what a post-2012 regime may look like are however left for the 2012 Durban UNFCCC 
meeting, and trade continues to play no significant direct role in negotiations, while 
continuing to lurk in the background as a major issue. With time seemingly running out, 
and seemingly little engagement between developed and developing countries on the 
deep but substantive issues of historical responsibility and the interpretation of CBDR, 
current expectations for a Durban outcome remain minimal. This situation is complicated 
by likely non-compliance with Kyoto commitments by some developed countries 
(especially Canada), and also the seeming lack of political commitment to major 
emissions limitation in the US. 
 
 
4. WHAT ROLE CAN TRADE POTENTIALLY PLAY IN HELPING ADVANCE THE 
UNFCCC PROCESS? 
 
  Given both the linkage between trade and climate change mitigation policies 
listed above and the, thus far, limited formal role that trade has played in UNFCCC 
negotiations, it seems worthwhile asking what role can trade potentially play in helping 
advance the UNFCCC process both to conclusion in Durban and beyond in subsequent 
negotiation rounds. In this discussion I will mainly focus on international trade in goods 
and services and their linkage to global climate mitigation arrangements more so than 
trade in emissions permits under JI and CDM. In passing, I will also note that issues of 
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trade rules for trade in goods (such as MFN and national treatment) that apply to trade in 
goods under GATT/ WTO equally arise for trade in emissions permits, and as yet have 
been little discussed. Non discriminatory trading in emissions permits would seemingly 
yield gains from removal of cross-country distortions, much as for trade in goods. 
  As I noted above, at the time of writing substantial pessimism surrounds the 
prospects for a positive outcome from Durban, and the issues and differences seem 
sufficiently major that seemingly trade policy can contribute only small opportunities for 
conclusive bargaining in Durban. Indeed, the perceived risk by developing countries of 
border tax adjustments emerging parallel to a UNFCCC agreement and outside the legal 
framework of such an agreement could even be an impediment to a conclusion in Durban. 
Developing countries would want to discipline the use of such measures beyond what 
may be possible in the WTO.  
  A contribution, however, that trade policy can make in advancing UNFCCC 
negotiations on a post-2012 global climate policy regime is in expanding the bargaining 
set to allow crossovers to non-climate issues. In also introducing a trade based penalty 
structure into the negotiation to support participation through trigger strategies (see 
Rubinstein (1979)) trade policy can potentially help, but could also hinder. The idea is 
that trade policy and climate change can be formally linked so that improvements in 
security of access for trade in goods relative to what is currently in place in the   22
GATT/WTO structure can be achieved, then countries who see trade benefits resulting 
could be more forthcoming with climate commitments so as to speed agreement.
13  
  Nowhere is this more so the case than with China, but it also applies to other high 
(or higher) growth economies such as India and Brazil. China’s high growth in the last 
few decades has been fueled by rapid export growth (nearly 30 per cent/ year 2004-2007) 
and FDI inflows which, in part, seek to take advantage of lower costs of exportation from 
China. China’s high export growth rates have, despite China’s WTO membership, 
resulted in large numbers of anti-dumping actions (and increasingly so from other 
developing countries such as India, Brazil and Turkey). China by some counts now faces 
around 25 per cent of anti-dumping actions globally. China has also been the object of 
selective safeguard actions on clothing (admittedly consistent with China’s WTO 
accession terms), as well as a recent US Section 301 initiation involving clean technology 
products.  
China’s export access receives some degree of protection from existing WTO 
disciplines, but it is incomplete. Enforcement in WTO involves lengthy process, and only 
weak bilateral penalties. Coverage of WTO disciplines is thus incomplete from a Chinese 
standpoint in terms of guaranteeing export access. China would benefit from strengthened 
trade rules beyond those in the WTO as part of a broad climate deal; but institutionally 
how such an outcome can be delivered is the issue. Similar arguments could be made for 




India and Brazil, but in these cases export growth rates have been lower and the 
contribution of international engagement in the country growth process is arguably less. 
  Contingent trade policy measures can also provide a penalty system to apply by 
participants in a global regime against potential non-participants in the form of border 
adjustments, even if their efficacy can be questioned. Carrots may apply through financial 
transfers, while sticks can be brought to bear through such trade measures.
14 The outcome 
of such measures is however unclear from the viewpoint of performance of the global 
economy. If higher participation levels result, this can be globally good. If they do not, 
the result can be heightened distortion of trade and impaired global economic 
performance. 
  Substantial debate has focused on both the efficiency and fairness of using these 
measures in this way, as well as their potential WTO compatibility. WTO compatibility 
will remain as an issue to be resolved though WTO dispute settlement process. No GATT 
panel ruling resulted from the EU adoption of the Value Added Tax (VAT) in the 1970s, 
with similar border tax adjustment measures, which differed in being across to board 
rather than differentiated by product, and also selective by source/ importing country. 
This time around there would thus almost certainly be the added feature of country 
discrimination at the border in trade involving participant and nonparticipant countries. 
Reference to WTO panel process would likely follow swiftly were such measures to be 
used, and the non-discrimination test would likely fail, although they would likely be 




defended as necessary measures under GATT article 20 (b), representing a threat to 
human health.
15 
  The fairness of these measures is equally contentious. Developing countries argue 
that such measures would slow their growth and development, and this outcome would be 
unfair because they are poor. Developed countries argue that they are a necessary 
accompaniment to a sub global climate regime to prevent leakage and improve efficiency. 
But seen against the theoretical literature on externalities there would seem to be no clear 
position on fairness, only an indication that their use would reflect an assertion of 
political power by those imposing them.  
Pigou (1932) in his initial statement of the externality problem called for 
correction through externality correcting Pigovian taxes. But later, Ronald Coase (1960) 
argued that all externality situations involve issues of property rights, but that who had 
the right to do what is inevitably arbitrary and issues of fairness do not arise. Put 
differently, should polluters be allowed to produce and they should be compensated for 
foregone profit from externality correcting measures, or do consumers have rights to 
clean air and water and they should be compensated for environmental damage? Coase 
argued that for localized externalities, property rights would be allocated through court 
process, but once allocated bargaining between the parties would achieve internalization. 
In such cases, Pigovian taxes would make things worse. However, for climate change the 
externality is transborder and there is no global court structure to determine who has the 
rights to do what. The outcome thus reflects the assertion of power, and power not 
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fairness (which will, of course, be argued for) will determine who is affected and in 
which way. 
  The efficiency of climate related trade actions is also debated since trade 
measures are very much second-best in this situation. Full internalization of the global 
externality from climate change involves full carbon pricing. Only in the absence of full 
internalization measures will trade measures come into play, and being second-best one 
can always construct cases in which efficiency impairments result. Most economists' 
intuition, however, is that this will be an unlikely outcome, but the positive net effects of 
trade measures in such situations have to be demonstrated for each case. 
  Trade policy can also play a role in providing the vehicle for both economic 
adjustment to the resulting climate policy measures through impacts on trade and 
investment flows, and as a facilitator for the adjustments needed to ensure climate 
mitigation (such as trade in technology needed for technology transfer). For now trade’s 
formal role in UNFCCC negotiations remains limited, but in the background its shadow 
lurks in the future in potentially major ways. And as the global economy moves beyond 
2012 and if climate change is further elevated as an issue due to growing physical 
damage, then more explicit incorporation of trade into climate policy debate seems likely 
to follow. 
 
5. THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 
  What the potential impacts might be of border tax adjustments (BTAs) to 
accompany a global climate regime is something which has been debated in recent 
literature. BTAs are seen (especially by developed countries) as mechanisms to both   26
prevent leakage of emissions reductions by participant countries in a new global regime 
through increased emissions by non-participant countries, and also as a way of addressing 
concerns over anti-competitive effects against domestic producers in participant countries. 
BTAs are effectively a series of tariffs on imports and rebates on exports based on the 
carbon content of goods traded and the applicable carbon price in the importing country. 
They can, in principle, be applied directly at the border based on measured carbon 
content or involve a required purchase by importers of domestic emissions allowances 
equivalent to what domestic producers would face. The former is effectively the EU 
scheme; the latter is the US scheme. Also, carbon content can be based on that in the 
exporting country (as in the EU proposals) or the carbon content in importing countries 
(the US scheme). As carbon content per dollar of GDP differs between China and the US 
by around four times, this is a very significant issue with BTAs. 
  Lockwood and Whalley (2010) discuss carbon based BTAs from the vantage 
point of the earlier debates on border adjustments in the EU at the time of the 
introduction of the VAT as a common harmonization instrument. In the late 1950s as part 
of the phased implementation of the Treaty of Rome it was agreed that a tax union among 
the original six EU members should follow the initial customs union. Indirect taxes were 
agreed to be the first element in tax harmonization and the VAT was agreed to be the 
harmonization instrument. Debate ensued on whether to use a destination basis under 
which imports were taxed and exports left countries tax free, or an origin basis which 
taxed exports and left imports tax free. An EU committee was established and the 
destination basis was chosen.   27
  The initial reaction of US business was hostile on the grounds EU exports would 
leave the EU tax free, while US exports to the EU would have to cross a tax barrier. 
Pressure thus mounted for a GATT negotiation on BTAs as part of the emerging Tokyo 
Round. This pressure was defused, however, by a series of academic papers (discussed in 
Lockwood and Whalley) which pointed out that in the broadly based tax case the 
difference between an origin and destination basis is effectively that between a 
production and consumption tax and in the broadly based tax case there should be no real 
effects in moving between them. Exchange rates would adjust in the flexible exchange 
rate case, or price levels or wage rates across countries would adjust in the fixed 
exchange rate case. These arguments carried the day. There was no GATT negotiation on 
border adjustments, nor has there been any dispute settlement case in either GATT or 
WTO since. 
  Lockwood and Whalley note the similarities of issues in the original VAT debate 
and now with carbon motivated BTAs. They note the product specificity in BTA rates 
involved for both imports and exports in the carbon case, and to argue that in appealing to 
earlier literature one would likely need to distinguish between variance and levels of 
BTA rates in assessing their impacts. The level component would have no real effects, 
appealing to earlier literature, while the variance in tax rates would. They also highlight 
the country discrimination in carbon motivated BTAs compared to the VAT case. This 
would seem to make a WTO dispute case focus on the potential Article 1 (MFN) 
violation, a case likely to be defended on Article 20 (general exceptions) grounds. 
  Other recent work has focused on the use of numerical simulation general 
equilibrium models to assess the potential impacts of BTAs. Mattoo et al (2011) use a   28
World Bank based model known as the Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied 
General Equilibrium Model (ENVISAGE). This is a recursive dynamic multisector 
multiregional model with the carbon emission and climate module. The model has no 
capability of providing welfare analysis and so the impacts on trade flows are the main 
focus. Their results suggest that BTAs by OECD countries would address 
competitiveness and leakage effects, and outputs and exports of energy-intensive 
manufactures by developing countries are expected to decline. They highlight the key 
issue of whether BTAs apply to carbon content in exporting or importing countries. 
Under the latter they show significant effects against China's manufacturing exports 
which can fall by a fifth. All lower and middle income country exports decline by 8 per 
cent. BTAs on carbon content in importing countries have much less impact. 
  Dong and Whalley (2009) in a related study use a multicountry general 
equilibrium model covering the EU, the US, China, and a residual rest of the world. In 
this model, countries produce commodities of varying emissions intensities using 
substitutable fossil fuel-based oil and non-oil inputs. Unlike in conventional general 
equilibrium trade models in which there is a fixed endowment of factor inputs for each 
country, here there is a supply a function for energy exporting countries with increasing 
extraction costs. Since emissions are directly related to energy use in production, 
emissions levels are endogenously determined and can change with policy change. They 
calibrate their model to 2006 data. 
  The results show generally small effects for BTAs, but as with Mattoo et al, 
results depend on assumptions (particularly the level of carbon pricing). They focus on 
BTAs based on carbon content of production in exporting countries. They also emphasize   29
how carbon pricing maps through into small differences in trade barriers for produced 
goods. They are able to analyze welfare effects and find they are also small. 
  Taken as a set these papers and literature would seem to emphasize that the 
impacts of BTAs will depend it intrinsically on the levels of carbon pricing (and 
emissions reduction) involved, as well as how BTAs are administered. For developing 
countries compared to the direct effects implied by such issues as historical responsibility 
for emissions reduction and the interpretation of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility, BTAs may prove to be a less serious issue. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Globally, the elevation of concern over potentially accelerated climate change has 
injected a new element into the nexus of global economic policy coordination that since 
the 1940s has been overseen by the triad of the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
WTO/GATT. The global economy up to the 1940s saw a global structure in which 
country economies were thought to be linked only by trade and finance, not physically. 
Climate changes this view of the economic world, which was anyway in flux from the 
1990s after WTO debates on broader trade and environment linkage (which now relative 
to climate seems quantitatively smaller). How the world responds to this challenge is 
really at the heart both of UNFCCC negotiation on a post-Kyoto climate regime, and 
their potential second round completion in Durban in 2012. 
  The argument I make here is that we should view climate more as an addition to 
the pre-existing global economic policy nexus of trade, investment, and finance, rather 
than as a separate stand-alone policy negotiation. Institutionally where this will lead us   30
may be one of the keys to global economic architecture for the 21st century. We have no 
World Environment or World Climate Organization. There is, for now, no serious 
discussion of how we might link the WTO and IMF to emerging climate institutions. And, 
communication between the WTO and UNFCCC secretariats is limited, but now growing 
from limited beginnings. We need to advance institutionally if we are to both bring 
climate into global center stage in economic policy and achieve significant mitigation, 
and this is the challenge. Here I have tried to spell out the dimensions of trade-climate 
linkage, and how these might grow over time. The institutional challenges this poses and 
resolving them in a timeframe which does not mirror international negotiations of the 
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